metamemory

Dementia sufferers become unaware of memory problems years before diagnosis

  • A large study found that people who developed dementia started to lose awareness of memory problems some 2½ years before dementia onset.
  • This loss of awareness was associated with three examples of neuropathology, including tau tangles and brain infarcts.

A ten-year study involving 2,092 older adults (average age 76) has found that people tended to lose awareness of memory problems two to three years before the onset of dementia.

Being unaware of your own memory problems is common in dementia, but previous research has focused on those already diagnosed with dementia. In this study, participants had no cognitive impairment at the beginning of the study.

Overall, subjective memory ratings taken annually were modestly correlated with performance (only modestly — people tend not to be that great at accurately assessing their own memory!), and this awareness was stable with age. However, in the subset of those who developed dementia (239 participants; 11%), this awareness started to deteriorate an average of 2.6 years before dementia was diagnosed (after which it dropped rapidly).

In a subset of those who died and had their brains examined (385 participants), a decline in memory awareness was associated with three pathologies:

  • tau tangles
  • gross cerebral infarcts
  • transactive response DNA-binding protein 43 pathology (TDP-43 is a protein involved in transcription, the first step in producing proteins from genes; mutations in the gene that produces TDP-43 have been linked to frontotemporal dementia and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS)).

There was no decline in memory awareness in those who didn't show any of these pathologies.

Those who were older at the beginning of the study were more likely to retain memory awareness longer, perhaps because they were more alert to memory problems.

http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/aug/27/dementia-sufferers-start-losing-memory-up-to-three-years-before-condition-develops-us-study

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Short online ‘pep talks’ can boost students

A large study shows how a 45-minute online intervention can improve struggling high school students' attitude to schoolwork, and thus their academic performance.

There's been a lot of talk in recent years about the importance of mindset in learning, with those who have a “growth mindset” (ie believe that intelligence can be developed) being more academically successful than those who believe that intelligence is a fixed attribute. A new study shows that a 45-minute online intervention can help struggling high school students.

The study involved 1,594 students in 13 U.S. high schools. They were randomly allocated to one of three intervention groups or the control group. The intervention groups either experienced an online program designed to develop a growth mindset, or an online program designed to foster a sense of purpose, or both programs (2 weeks apart). All interventions were expected to improve academic performance, especially in struggling students.

The interventions had no significant benefits for students who were doing okay, but were of significant benefit for those who had an initial GPA of 2 or less, or had failed at least one core subject (this group contained 519 students; a third of the total participants). For this group, each of the interventions was of similar benefit; interestingly, the combined intervention was less beneficial than either single intervention. It's plausibly suggested that this might be because the different messages weren't integrated, and students may have had some trouble in taking on board two separate messages.

Overall, for this group of students, semester grade point averages improved in core academic courses and the rate at which students performed satisfactorily in core courses increased by 6.4%.

GPA average in core subjects (math, English, science, social studies) was calculated at the end of the semester before the interventions, and at the end of the semester after the interventions. Brief questions before and after the interventions assessed the students' beliefs about intelligence, and their sense of meaningfulness about schoolwork.

GPA before intervention was positively associated with a growth mindset and a sense of purpose, explaining why the interventions had no effect on better students. Only the growth mindset intervention led to a more malleable view of intelligence; only the sense-of-purpose intervention led to a change in perception in the value of mundane academic tasks. Note that the combined intervention showed no such effects, suggesting that it had confused rather than enlightened!

In the growth mindset intervention, students read an article describing the brain’s ability to grow and reorganize itself as a consequence of hard work and good strategies. The message that difficulties don't indicate limited ability but rather provide learning opportunities, was reinforced in two writing exercises. The control group read similar materials, but with a focus on functional localization in the brain rather than its malleability.

In the sense-of-purpose interventions, students were asked to write about how they wished the world could be a better place. They read about the reasons why some students worked hard, such as “to make their families proud”; “to be a good example”; “to make a positive impact on the world”. They were then asked to think about their own goals and how school could help them achieve those objectives. The control group completed one of two modules that didn't differ in impact. In one, students described how their lives were different in high school compared to before. The other was much more similar to the intervention, except that the emphasis was on economic self-interest rather than social contribution.

The findings are interesting in showing that you can help poor learners with a simple intervention, but perhaps even more, for their indication that such interventions are best done in a more holistic and contextual way. A more integrated message would hopefully have been more effective, and surely ongoing reinforcement in the classroom would make an even bigger difference.

http://www.futurity.org/high-school-growth-mindset-910082/

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Brain training helps cognitive decline in many cancer survivors

November, 2012

A pilot study found that both training in memory strategies and processing speed training had significant benefits for breast cancer survivors with concerns about their memory and cognition.

Cancer survivors who underwent chemotherapy often suffer long-term cognitive problems. Until now, most research has been occupied with establishing that this is in fact the case, and studies investigating how to help have been rare. I recently reported on studies suggesting that help with sleep problems and stress can be beneficial. It has also been suggested that exercise can help. None of these suggestions are special to cancer survivors (although cancer survivors may well be one of several groups that derive particular benefit). Similarly, a new study investigates another familiar approach to improving cognitive decline.

The pilot study involved 82 post-menopausal breast cancer survivors (average age 56) who had received chemotherapy and who were worried about their cognitive abilities. The women were randomly assigned to one of three groups: one group received memory training adapted from the ACTIVE (Advanced Cognitive Training for Independent and Vital Elderly) trial; another received processing speed training using Posit Science’s Insight program (commercially available); the third was a wait-listed control group.

Training consisted of ten 1-hour small-group (3-5 people) sessions over 6-8 weeks. Memory training involved learning strategies and applying them to word lists, sequences, and texts. Strategies included mnemonic techniques, as well as instruction in principles of meaningfulness, organization, visualization, and association. Strategies were taught and practiced in the first five sessions, and further practiced in the remaining sessions.

In the Insight program, stimulus duration is progressively shortened during a series of progressively more difficult information-processing tasks, such as time-order judgment, discrimination, spatial-match, forward-span, instruction-following, and narrative-memory tasks. Exercises automatically adjust to maintain an 85% correct rate.

Both programs proved beneficial. The memory training group showed significant improvement in immediate and delayed memory, which was maintained at the two-month follow-up. There was of course individual variability: 39% showed significant improvement on immediate memory (compared to 18% of controls) and 42% on delayed memory (compared to 11% of controls). While the group as a whole didn’t show significant improvement in processing speed, some 73% of the group showed reliable improvement at the two-month follow-up.

The Insight group showed significant improvement on both memory and processing speed. Some 68% improved processing speed (compared to 43% of controls). But note that at the 2-month follow-up, the 67% of the Insight group is not that much greater than the 61% of the controls (demonstrating very clearly the benefits of even the small amount of practice received in testing) and is in fact less than the 73% of the memory group.

The Insight group also showed significant improvement in memory. At two-month follow-up, some 30% of the Insight group had improved immediate memory (compared to the 18% of controls), and 33% had improved delayed memory (vs 11%).

Both training programs had a positive effect on perceived cognitive functioning and symptom distress (mood, anxiety, fatigue), and there was no difference between the groups in terms of satisfaction with the training (both groups were very satisfied).

The researchers concluded that, while both training programs were promising, the dual effect of processing speed training (on memory as well as processing speed) argued for its broader benefits.

However, I note that, although the size of the effect of memory training on processing speed was too small to reach statistical significance, the fact that the number of participants showing reliable improvement was greater than that of the Insight group points to an equally broad effect of memory training. If the memory training was supplemented by a small amount of practice on tasks designed to boost processing speed, it would seem to me that this might produce greater cognitive benefits than the processing speed training. Indeed, the Insight program was, I believe, first developed in the context of the ACTIVE program, and I have, of course, talked before about the value of training that includes multiple domains.

Still, the main message of this study should not be overlooked: it demonstrates that many cancer survivors suffering from cognitive decline can improve their cognitive performance through training and practice.

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Fluctuating sense of control linked to cognitive ability in older adults

April, 2012

A small study has found that, in older adults, their sense of control fluctuates over the course of a day, and this affects their cognitive abilities.

Previous research has pointed to a typical decline in our sense of control as we get older. Maintaining a sense of control, however, appears to be a key factor in successful aging. Unsurprisingly, in view of the evidence that self-belief and metacognitive understanding are important for cognitive performance, a stronger sense of control is associated with better cognitive performance. (By metacognitive understanding I mean the knowledge that cognitive performance is malleable, not fixed, and strategies and training are effective in improving cognition.)

In an intriguing new study, 36 older adults (aged 61-87, average age 74) had their cognitive performance and their sense of control assessed every 12 hours for 60 days. Participants were asked questions about whether they felt in control of their lives and whether they felt able to achieve goals they set for themselves.

The reason I say this is intriguing is that it’s generally assumed that a person’s sense of control — how much they feel in control of their lives — is reasonably stable. While, as I said, it can change over the course of a lifetime, until recently we didn’t think that it could fluctuate significantly in the course of a single day — which is what this study found.

Moreover, those who normally reported having a low sense of control performed much better on inductive reasoning tests during periods when they reported feeling a higher sense of control. Similarly, those who normally reported feeling a high sense of control scored higher on memory tests when feeling more in control than usual.

Although we can’t be sure (since this wasn’t directly investigated), the analysis suggests that the improved cognitive functioning stems from the feeling of improved control, not vice versa.

The study builds on an earlier study that found weekly variability in older adults’ locus of control and competency beliefs.

Assessment was carried out in the form of a daily workbook, containing a number of measures, which participants completed twice daily. Each assessment took around 30-45 minutes to complete. The measures included three cognitive tests (14 alternate forms of each of these were used, to minimize test familiarity):

  • Letter series test: 30 items in which the next letter in a series had to be identified. [Inductive reasoning]
  • Number comparison: 48 items in which two number strings were presented beside each other, and participants had to identify where there was any mismatch. [Perceptual speed]
  • Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Task: participants have to study a list of 15 unrelated words for one minute, then on another page recall as many of the words as they could. [Memory]

Sense of control over the previous 12 hours was assessed by 8 questions, to which participants indicated their agreement/disagreement on a 6-point scale. Half the questions related to ‘locus of control’ and half to ‘perceived competence’.

While, unsurprisingly, compliance wasn’t perfect (it’s quite an arduous regime), participants completed on average 115 of 120 workbooks. Of the possible 4,320 results (36 x 120), only 166 were missing.

One of the things that often annoys me is the subsuming of all within-individual variability in cognitive scores into averages. Of course averages are vital, but so is variability, and this too often is glossed over. This study is, of course, all about variability, so I was very pleased to see people’s cognitive variability spelled out.

Most of the variance in locus of control was of course between people (86%), but 14% was within-individual. Similarly, the figures for perceived competence were 88% and 12%. (While locus of control and perceived competence are related, only 26% of the variability in within-person locus of control was associated with competence, meaning that they are largely independent.)

By comparison, within-individual variability was much greater for the cognitive measures: for the letter series (inductive reasoning), 32% was within-individual and 68% between-individual; for the number matching (perceptual speed), 21% was within-individual and 79% between-individual; for the memory test, an astounding 44% was within-individual and 56% between-individual.

Some of this within-individual variability in cognitive performance comes down to practice effects, which were significant for all cognitive measures. For the memory test, time of day was also significant, with performance being better in the morning. For the letter and number series tests, previous performance also had a small effect on perceived competence. For the number matching, increase in competence subsequent to increased performance was greatest for those with lower scores. However, lagged analyses indicated that beliefs preceded performance to a greater extent than performance preceding beliefs.

While it wasn’t an aspect of this study, it should also be noted that a person’s sense of control may well vary according to domain (e.g., cognition, social interaction, health) and context. In this regard, it’s interesting to note the present findings that sense of control affected inductive reasoning for low-control individuals, but memory for high-control individuals, suggesting that the cognitive domain also matters.

Now this small study was a preliminary one and there are several limitations that need to be tightened up in subsequent research, but I think it’s important for three reasons:

  • as a demonstration that cognitive performance is not a fixed attribute;
  • as a demonstration of the various factors that can affect older adults’ cognitive performance;
  • as a demonstration that your beliefs about yourself are a factor in your cognitive performance.

Reference: 

[2794] Neupert SD, Allaire JC. I think I can, I think I can: Examining the within-person coupling of control beliefs and cognition in older adults. Psychology and Aging. 2012 :No Pagination Specified - No Pagination Specified.

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Memory fitness program improves memory abilities of oldest adults

October, 2011

A six-week memory fitness program offered to older adults helped improve their ability to recognize and recall words.

In a study involving 115 seniors (average age 81), those who participated in a six-week, 12-session memory training program significantly improved their verbal memory. 15-20 seniors participated in each hour-long class, which included explanations of how memory works, quick strategies for remembering names, faces and numbers, basic memory strategies such as linking ideas and creating visual images, and information on a healthy lifestyle for protecting and maintaining memory.

Most of the study participants were women, Caucasian and had attained a college degree or higher level of education.

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Fluency heuristic is not everyone’s rule

April, 2011

Two experiments indicate that judgment about how well something is learned is based on encoding fluency only for people who believe intelligence is a fixed attribute.

It’s well-established that feelings of encoding fluency are positively correlated with judgments of learning, so it’s been generally believed that people primarily use the simple rule, easily learned = easily remembered (ELER), to work out whether they’re likely to remember something (as discussed in the previous news report). However, new findings indicate that the situation is a little more complicated.

In the first experiment, 75 English-speaking students studied 54 Indonesian-English word pairs. Some of these were very easy, with the English words nearly identical to their Indonesian counterpart (e.g, Polisi-Police); others required more effort but had a connection that helped (e.g, Bagasi-Luggage); others were entirely dissimilar (e.g., Pembalut-Bandage).

Participants were allowed to study each pair for as long as they liked, then asked how confident they were about being able to recall the English word when supplied the Indonesian word on an upcoming test. They were tested at the end of their study period, and also asked to fill in a questionnaire which assessed the extent to which they believed that intelligence is fixed or changeable.

It’s long been known that theories of intelligence have important effects on people's motivation to learn. Those who believe each person possesses a fixed level of intelligence (entity theorists) tend to disengage when something is challenging, believing that they’re not up to the challenge. Those who believe that intelligence is malleable (incremental theorists) keep working, believing that more time and effort will yield better results.

The study found that those who believed intelligence is fixed did indeed follow the ELER heuristic, with their judgment of how well an item was learned nicely matching encoding fluency.

However those who saw intelligence as malleable did not follow the rule, but rather seemed to be following the reverse heuristic: that effortful encoding indicates greater engagement in learning, and thus is a sign that they are more likely to remember. This group therefore tended to be marginally underconfident of easy items, marginally overconfident for medium-level items, and significantly overconfident for difficult items.

However, the entanglement of item difficulty and encoding fluency weakens this finding, and accordingly a second experiment separated these two attributes.

In this experiment, 41 students were presented with two lists of nine words, one list of which was in small font (18-point Arial) and one in large font (48-point Arial). Each word was displayed for four seconds. While font size made no difference to their actual levels of recall, entity theorists were much more confident of recalling the large-size words than the small-size ones. The incremental theorists were not, however, affected by font-size.

It is suggested that the failure to find evidence of a ‘non-fluency heuristic’ in this case may be because participants had no control over learning time, therefore were less able to make relative judgments of encoding effort. Nevertheless, the main finding, that people varied in their use of the fluency heuristic depending on their beliefs about intelligence, was clear in both cases.

Reference: 

[2182] Miele DB, Finn B, Molden DC. Does Easily Learned Mean Easily Remembered?. Psychological Science [Internet]. 2011 ;22(3):320 - 324. Available from: http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/3/320.abstract

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People are poor at predicting their learning

April, 2011

A series of online experiments demonstrate that beliefs about memory, judgments of how likely you are to remember, and actual memory performance, are all largely independent of each other.

Research has shown that people are generally poor at predicting how likely they are to remember something. A recent study tested the theory that the reason we’re so often inaccurate is that we make predictions about memory based on how we feel while we're encountering the information to be learned, and that can lead us astray.

In three experiments, each involving about 80 participants ranging in age from late teens to senior citizens, participants were serially shown words in large or small fonts and asked to predict how well they'd remember each (actual font sizes depended on the participants’ browsers, since this was an online experiment and participants were in their own homes, but the larger size was four times larger than the other).

In the first experiment, each word was presented either once or twice, and participants were told if they would have another chance to study the word. The length of time the word was displayed on the first occasion was controlled by the participant. On the second occasion, words were displayed for four seconds, and participants weren’t asked to make a new prediction. At the end of the study phase, they had two minutes to type as many words as they remembered.

Recall was significantly better when an item was seen twice. Recall wasn’t affected by font size, but participants were significantly more likely to believe they’d recall those presented in larger fonts. While participants realized seeing an item twice would lead to greater recall, they greatly underestimated the benefits.

Because people so grossly discounted the benefit of a single repetition, in the next experiment the comparison was between one and four study trials. This time, participants gave more weight to having three repetitions versus none, but nevertheless, their predictions were still well below the actual benefits of the repetitions.

In the third experiment, participants were given a simplified description of the first experiment and either asked what effect they’d expect font size to have, or what effect having two study trials would have. The results (similar levels of belief in the benefits of each condition) neither resembled the results in the first experiment (indicating that those people’s predictions hadn’t been made on the basis of their beliefs about memory effects), or the actual performance (demonstrating that people really aren’t very good at predicting their memory performance).

These findings were confirmed in a further experiment, in which participants were asked about both variables (rather than just one).

The findings confirm other evidence that (a) general memory knowledge tends to be poor, (b) personal memory awareness tends to be poor, and (c) ease of processing is commonly used as a heuristic to predict whether something will be remembered.

 

Addendum: a nice general article on this topic by the lead researcher Nate Kornell has just come out in Miller-McCune

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Kornell, N., Rhodes, M. G., Castel, A. D., & Tauber, S. K. (in press). The ease of processing heuristic and the stability bias: Dissociating memory, memory beliefs, and memory judgments. Psychological Science.

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Individual differences in ability to gauge your own accuracy

October, 2010

Differences in the size and connectivity of a region in the prefrontal cortex underlie how accurate people are in judging their own performance.

Metamemory or metacognition — your ability to monitor your own cognitive processes — is central to efficient and effective learning. Research has also shown that, although we customarily have more faith in person’s judgment the more confident they are in it, a person’s accuracy and their confidence in their accuracy are two quite separate things (which is not to say it’s not a useful heuristic; just that it’s far from infallible). A new study involving 32 participants has looked at individual differences in judging personal accuracy when assessing a geometric image, comparing these differences to differences in the brain.

The perceptual test used simple stimuli, and each one was customized to the individual's level of skill in order to achieve a score of 71%. In keeping with previous research, there was considerable variation in the participants’ accuracy in assessing their own responses. But the intriguing result was that these differences were reflected in differences in the volume of gray matter in the right anterior prefrontal cortex. Moreover, those who were better at judging their own performance not only had more neurons in that region, but also tended to have denser connections between the region and the white matter connected to it. The anterior prefrontal cortex is associated with various executive functions, and seems to be more developed in humans compared to other animals.

The finding should not be taken to indicate a genetic basis for metacognitive ability. The finding implies nothing about whether the physical differences are innate or achieved by training and experience. However it seems likely that, like most skills and abilities, a lot of it is training.

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